Titulo |
The financial crisis and the European Parliament: An analysis of the Two-Pack legislation |
Autoría |
Roger L, Otjes S, van der Veer H. |
Fuente |
Eur Union Polit. 2017 Dec;18(4):560-580. doi: 10.1177/1465116517716311. Epub 2017 Jul 3. |
Resumen |
The left-right line of conflict has been the dominant dimension of decision-making in the European Parliament since 1979. A pro-/anti-European Union integration dimension is of secondary importance. Limited evidence exists on the conditions under which these different dimensions matter. This study examines parliamentary decision-making about the so-called Two-Pack, which moved responsibilities about budgetary decision-making to the European Commission. The article uses in-depth interviews, textual analysis of committee debates and roll call voting analysis in order to determine which lines of conflict matter at which stage of decision-making. The evidence indicates that left-right division is dominant in the informal stage preceding committee debates, while both the pro-/anti-European Union and the left/right dimensions matter during the committee stage, whereas for plenary votes, the pro-/anti-European Union dimension is crucial. |
URL |
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29187803 |